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Abstract:  In some respects natural selection is a quite simple theory, arrived at through the logical 
integration of three propositions (the presence of variation within natural populations, an absolutely 
limited resources base, and procreation capacities exceeding mere replacement numbers) whose 
individual truths can hardly be denied. Its relation to the larger subject of evolution, however, remains 
problematic. It is suggested here that a scaling-down of the meaning of natural selection to “the 
elimination of the unfit,” as originally intended by Alfred Russel Wallace (1823-1913), might ultimately 
prove a more effective means of relating it to larger-scale, longer-term, evolutionary processes. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
For over one hundred and fifty years the theory of natural selection has inspired an ever-
expanding investigation into the world of adaptation, that critical element of biodiversity that 
draws the twin matters of ecological and evolutionary causality face to face. The focus has 
always been on understanding function within the natural world, and how to trace it backwards 
through time to the origin of species. We envision, as did Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel 
Wallace, a “tree of life” that phylogenetically connects present forms back to their ancestors, and 
imagine that this tree represents not only the historical linkages between forms, but an actual 
coming-into-being process. 
 
There can be no doubt that these links represent real evolutionary associations; beyond our 
increasing knowledge of DNA sequences, which seemingly proves this outright, one needs look 
no further than Wallace’s “Sarawak Law” essay of 1855 [1], which pointed to an otherwise 
unexplainable connection between most closely related species and their distributions in space 
(geographical range) and time (the fossil record). Nothing other than a diverging—evolving—
pattern of relations could explain such a thing. For its own part, the concept of natural selection 
is based on elements that themselves can hardly be denied: there really is variation within natural 
populations, and a limited resource base that could in theory be overrun by the high native rates 
of procreation within species. Unless one argues that what would generally be understood as 
“less fit” individuals on the average should compete as well as more fit ones—and one cannot—
it seems inescapable logic that the latter will tend to prevail, and preferentially pass their genes 
along to their progeny. 
 
And yet natural selection has always found itself under attack, and sometimes for good 
reasons. While lending itself perfectly well to interpretations of many immediate relationships—
that is, to the facts of adaptation—it has proved largely ineffectual in contextualizing the larger-
scale: especially, the causes of variation, divergence, and speciation [2], other key (and 
empirically evident) products of biological evolution. There is evidently a disconnect in the 
theory between its ecological enactment and its historical “accumulations” (as both Darwin and 
Wallace referred to them), recapitulated both in the DNA molecule and its manifest expressions 
as functioning individuals and populations. Darwin was largely oblivious to this difficulty but 
Wallace was not; this is perhaps not surprising as the former looked at the entirety largely from a 
geologist’s historical vantage point, whereas Wallace was more the ecologist and geographer. 
The Darwinian version of natural selection soon found itself attacked as a tautology. As 
Lewontin once put it, “The process is adaptation and the end result is the state of being adapted . 
. . The problem is how species can be at all times both adapting and adapted.” [3] 
 
Generations of biologists and historians have identified various differences between 
Darwinian and Wallacean understandings of natural selection. There are many particulars, but 
for now two main ones may be emphasized: (1) Darwin viewed competition as occurring mainly 
between individual organisms, whereas Wallace emphasized the dynamics between varieties, and 
(2) Wallace tended to regard environmental pressures such as climate or geological change as the 
main selection-generating forces, whereas Darwin looked more to individual competition for 
resources, including sexual selection, as of primary import. In what follows I will, perhaps 
surprisingly, not play to a favorite: I believe both discussions represent red herrings. Instead, I 
would like to start by re-examining the basic question of what natural selection is—or perhaps 
better yet, what it is not—and then consider how a more limited view of natural selection—a 
more Wallacean view—might help us to identify some interesting causalities within the 
evolutionary process. 
 
2. NATURAL SELECTION AS THE ELIMINATION OF THE UNFIT 
 
In 1888 C. Lloyd Morgan, in some quarters referred to as the father of comparative 
psychology, made a presentation entitled “Elimination and Selection” to the Bristol Naturalists’ 
Society. Despite Morgan’s fame, this is a little known work, as it was published in the Society’s 
obscure Journal series. [4] As the first three paragraphs of the paper well introduce the present 
thread, they may be reproduced in full: 
Those who have read the recently-published “Life of Charles Darwin” may remember a footnote in which 
Mr. A. R. Wallace criticizes the phrase “Natural Selection.” “The term ‘Survival of the Fittest,’” he says, 
“is the plain expression of the fact; ‘Natural Selection’ is a metaphorical expression of it, and to a certain 
degree indirect and incorrect, since Nature does not so much select special varieties as exterminate the most 
unfavourable ones.” Mr. Darwin, while admitting with his wonted candour the force of this criticism, urges 
in support of the use of his own phrase, first, that it can be employed as a substantive governing a verb; 
secondly, that it serves to connect artificial and natural selection; and thirdly, that its meaning is not 
obvious, and that this leads men to think the matter out for themselves. 
I propose here briefly to consider Mr. Wallace’s criticism; to suggest provisionally the use of the phrase, 
“Natural Elimination,” which can be employed as a substantive “governing a verb”; and to indicate the 
advantages which would attend the use of such a term, not the least of which is, that it serves to distinguish 
between artificial selection and “natural selection.” 
Mr. Herbert Spencer’s term, “Survival of the Fittest,” says Mr. Wallace, is the plain expression of the fact; 
“Natural Selection” is a metaphorical expression of it. Yes; but in the first place, Mr. Spencer’s phrase 
gives no inkling of the process by which such survival is brought about; and, in the second place, it is 
questionable whether any phrase, which does so indicate the process, can escape the charge of being in 
some degree metaphorical. The sting of Mr. Wallace’s criticism, therefore, would appear to lie 
(appropriately) in the tail, where he points out that Nature does not so much select special varieties as 
exterminate the most unfavourable ones. This seems to me a valid criticism; one which Mr. Darwin does 
not sufficiently meet; and one which still holds good. I would, however, venture to suggest that the word 
“eliminate,” though somewhat metaphorical, is more satisfactory than Wallace’s word, “exterminate”; and I 
further venture to suggest that the use of the phrase, Natural Elimination, would emphasize the fact that, 
whereas in artificial selection it is almost invariably the fittest which are chosen out for survival, it is not so 
under Nature; the “survival of the fittest” under Nature being in the main the net result of a slow and 
gradual process of the elimination of the unfit. The well-adapted are not selected; but the ill-adapted are 
rejected; or rather, the failures are just inevitably eliminated. 
This was not the only occasion on which Morgan made these points [5], nor was he the only 
one to consider the matter [6], but the term “natural elimination” never caught on. Wallace 
himself apparently became more aware that his view differed from Darwin’s as time passed. He 
had referred in print to this notion of the removal of the unfit at least as early as 1877 [7]; it is not 
known whether Wallace knew of Morgan’s essay, but by 1890, in one of his most famous essays, 
“Human Selection,” he straightforwardly states:  “The survival of the fittest is really the 
extinction of the unfit.” [8] In an 1894 interview he remarks “I believe that the unfit will be 
gradually eliminated from the race, and human progress secured,” [9] and a year later, in “The 
Method of Organic Evolution,” he writes “Without making some numerical estimate of this kind 
it is impossible to realise the severity of the struggle continually going on in nature and the 
resultant elimination of the unfit.” [10]   
If Wallace believed, and surely he did, that “elimination of the unfit” was what “survival of 
the fittest” really came down to, why did he bother using the second term at all? The reason 
seems evident from the following passages from two other late works of his: 
Herbert Spencer suggested the term “survival of the fittest,” as more closely representing what actually 
occurs; and it is undoubtedly this survival, by extermination of the unfit, combined with universally present 
variation, which brings about that marvellous adaptation to the ever-varying environment . . . [11] 
This continual weeding out of the less fit, in every generation, and with exceptional severity in recurring 
adverse seasons, will produce two distinct effects, which require to be clearly distinguished. The first is the 
preservation of each species in the highest state of adaptation to the conditions of its existence; and, 
therefore, so long as these conditions remained unchanged, the effect of natural selection is to keep each 
well-adapted species also unchanged. The second effect is produced whenever the conditions vary, when, 
taking advantage of the variations continually occurring in all well-adapted and therefore populous species, 
the same process will slowly but surely bring about complete adaptation to the new conditions. And here 
another fact—the normal variability of all populous or dominant species, which is seldom realized except 
by those who have largely and minutely compared the individuals of many species in a state of nature—
comes into play. There are some writers who admit all the preceding facts and reasoning, so far as the 
action of natural selection in weeding out the unfit and thus keeping every species in the highest state of 
efficiency is concerned, but who deny that it can modify them in such a way as to adapt them to new 
conditions, because they allege that “the right variations will not always occur at the right time.” This 
seems a strong and real objection to many of their readers, but to those who have studied the variability of 
species in nature, it is a mere verbal difficulty dependent on ignorance of the actual facts. [12] 
He thus apparently acknowledged that “elimination of the unfit” per se does not well lend 
itself to the notion of “adapting” in an evolutionary sense. Yet, while “elimination of the unfit” 
might only serve to keep species in “the highest state of adaptation,” Wallace could fall back on 
the understanding that changing conditions are what stimulate the kind of directional selection 
process leading to evolution. This is where, I believe, Wallace goes wrong. “Changing 
conditions,” on whatever scale, are themselves a function of evolution (not necessarily just 
biological ones, of course, but the whole system is integrally interconnected), and cannot merely 
be assumed. A chicken-or-egg situation has been set out in which the initial conditions of 
causality have not been specified. 
Another way of putting this is to suggest that just as negentropy is not merely the “opposite” 
of entropy, neither does evolution imply something that is automatically the opposite of 
“elimination of the unfit.” Evolution of any kind, including biological in particular, implies a 
movement away from chaos and towards higher levels of order. The thoughts of the late Steven 
Jay Gould and others notwithstanding, evolution as witnessed on this planet, and probably 
universally (even if only locally), is progressive. Whether it is progressive toward some 
predestined end, as some would suggest, is quite another matter, but one cannot sensibly argue 
that insects, for example, whatever their numbers and diversity, individually or as a group 
display responses to impinging stresses that are as advanced as those by vertebrate species. If 
Wallace—and the rest of us—wish to show how the “non-unfit” are really contributing to 
evolution, we must show how their (ecological) actions are producing a net increase in the 
overall information content of the active earth surface layer. 
Unfortunately, while we can prove easily enough that evolution really has taken place, it is 
not so easy to demonstrate that natural selection as usually conceived is responsible for this 
progression of complexification (both in individual forms, and doubtlessly at the entire 
environmental level as well).  Actually, and even assuming it operates as Darwin envisioned, at 
least five related causalities (or lack thereof)—and undoubtedly others—can be posed that might, 
in the absence of contravening forces, stop it in its tracks. 
First, and again, what is there in the natural selection concept that actually argues for a 
process of complexification over time, as opposed to mere change, or even diversification?  That 
is to say, why is the planet not populated by no more than an endless array of microorganisms 
that merely morph over time into further endless arrays of microorganisms? (And for that matter, 
just how effective has natural selection been in explaining speciation into discrete population 
entities?: not very.) 
Second, what is there in the logic of the process of natural selection (as opposed to its 
supposed observed results, that is) that demonstrates that the physical environment is not so 
fickle and changeable as to present too difficult a challenge for selection to overcome?  And 
there is beyond this the possibility that as that environment itself evolves into wholly new sets of 
relationships, it could do so in ways that natural selection is powerless to address. 
Further, we may be confident at this point that mutations introduce new diversity into the 
biological system, but can natural selection tell us whether this diversity is of a productive type 
frequently enough, or even under what circumstances it might be?  Perhaps the rate of mutation 
is so great, and its usually evil effects so prevalent, that some other force is needed to steer its 
results in a productive direction. 
Perhaps worst of all, is it actually evolutionarily—as opposed to ecologically—productive in 
all instances to adapt?  More specifically, where adaptation results in highly specific ties to 
various (physical or biological) elements of the environment, what are the long-term downsides 
to this kind of association?  One, of course, is proneness to extinction, but another perhaps 
further-reaching one is an unlikelihood of further diversification into forms with an ability to 
enter into substantially new kinds of associations, or indefinitely perpetuating ones.  Insects, for 
all their great number and diversity, have never given rise to any other Class of organized beings 
since they themselves came into existence. Diversification, in mere terms of speciosity, is only 
one element of evolution, and perhaps not even its defining element. 
Lastly, and most interesting, what if there are a priori limitations to the nature of complex 
structure that natural selection must work around to function at all? The DNA molecule, for 
example, seems to display a rather similar structure all the way up and down the living world, 
and we have tacitly assumed that the reason for this lies in an unconstrained random-walk-
modified-by-negative-feedbacks kind of evolutionary process—just the same assumption we 
have made regarding the history of emergence of living variety in general.  Even if this is to 
some extent true, there still may well be overarching constraints on the structure of complex 
systems that create absolute limits to that process, or that push it in certain directions. 
And, as if these suppositions were not enough to cause some worries, many years of diligent 
study by paleontologists have shown that many or most populations in fact do not change in a 
manner reflecting the basic Darwinian dictum of slow, continual adaptation.  We are now aware 
of many species that have shown little if any alteration for even many tens of millions of years. It 
appears to be more common that short bursts of innovation take place that push species into new 
adaptive equilibrium states for varying periods of time. Wallace suspected as much; in 1880 he 
wrote: “. . . the extreme slowness of the action of natural selection, on which Mr. Darwin 
repeatedly dwells, is by no means an essential characteristic of it . . . if, as must often have 
happened, conditions have changed with comparative rapidity, then the enormous amount of 
individual variation, which would be taken advantage of every year by the survival of the fittest, 
might effect changes in a single century quite as great as those which distinguish nearly allied 
species.” [13] 
Now understand that this is not to try to suggest that any of these forces necessarily have 
unduly complicated, or impeded, the evolutionary process.  Instead, the point I am trying to 
make is that in our efforts “to make natural selection work” a lot of potentially interesting 
irregularities are merely being explained away.  The Darwinian approach to natural selection 
tacitly assumes that all of these possibly extenuating influences must have been overcome—thus, 
natural selection emerges as a transcendental force that simply supersedes all and any such 
agencies.  Yet it provides limited insight into how this is accomplished. 
Such considerations should make us wary of attempts to conceptualize natural selection as a 
process model. It may be more fruitful to begin with the unassailable—the facts of super-ample 
rates of procreation, limited resources, and genetics—and agree with Wallace that natural 
selection represents no more than the notion of the elimination of the unfit, and its consequence 
of the “highest state of adaptation to the conditions of its existence; and, therefore, so long as 
these conditions remained unchanged, the effect of natural selection is to keep each well-adapted 
species also unchanged” [14].  This fairly exact starting point allows us to ask without fear of 
circularity: what conditions surrounding those that do survive are tending to push the overall 
state of negentropy on the planet’s surface to higher levels? 
While it is undoubtedly true that there are genetic differences between those individuals in 
any population that don’t survive very long and those that do, it is arguably not these differences 
per se that drive evolution. Instead, and technically speaking, it is the fact that the second group 
has a greater opportunity to engage with its environment (defined broadly) in a nonrandom 
fashion that ultimately drives phylogenesis. So, we are speaking most fundamentally of assembly 
rules here. On the average, adaptive arrays that better suit ecological conditions (again, physical 
and/or biological) will more likely be embraced by them, but this is not a tautological statement 
because the causalities that are coming together are quite distinct in nature.  The individual 
organism, once in existence, is little more than an automaton, programmed by its DNA.  The 
environment, by contrast, is infinitely complex, offering varying and continually changing 
probabilities of success of engagement over time—and beyond this there is the further 
complication that such probabilities are spatially autocorrelated: all of them are the more or less 
so in an actual spatial context. Evolution takes place as this two-way set of relationships works 
out ever more intricate inter-causalities. 
3. A NATURAL SELECTION TYPOLOGY 
Starting with the basic notion that a population’s array of adaptations gives it the potential to 
engage its environment in a spatially nonrandom way that is implicitly information-accruing, it is 
possible to construct a typology of interaction types that might, or do, influence the way 
biological evolution in the longer term sense plays out. In some of these, the changes anticipated 
and how they occur coincide fairly closely with conventional Darwinian interpretations, but in 
some they do not. We may call this typology the “Opportunities and Constraints” model. We 
begin with the opportunities. 
3.1. Opportunities for Adaptation 
Natural selection of a Darwinian type is most straightforwardly apparent when some easily 
modified part of an organism’s body undergoes selection resulting in an adaptation that accrues a 
specific and immediate significant advantage.  A good example is protective mimicry, in which a 
usually less common form comes to resemble a more common, and in one manner or another 
noxious, species.  In general, any environment will provide a range of opportunities for 
productive engagement, so the longer term question in this instance is whether such engagement 
results in a narrowing, or expansion, of evolutionary opportunities and inertias.  A short term 
advantage may be accrued by assuming a coloration or bodily shape that provides camouflage, 
but this specialization will be to no avail in the longer term if the host species is suddenly 
eradicated through disease or competition. 
Still, this form of adaptation is undeniably very widespread, and under the right 
circumstances leads to great levels of diversification over long periods of time.  Parasitism falls 
into this category of engagement.  Many parasitic species undoubtedly have co-existed with their 
hosts throughout the latter’s entire period of existence, and by implication before it.  The hosts 
themselves, of course, continue to counter-modify in response, as the Red Queen Hypothesis 
suggests. [15] 
3.2. Constraints on Adaptation 
At first it may be difficult to appreciate how added constraints on the range of adaptive 
potential might stimulate evolutionary diversity, but there are some complex considerations here. 
Let us group these under the headings “Conventional,” “Implicit,” and “Explicit.” 
3.2.1. Conventional Constraints 
Under “Conventional” we may recognize all those factors, many long understood, that 
directly force adjustments in organic development and function. Historically, attention was first 
drawn to those resources whose relative rarities seemed to affect presence and absence; the work 
which popularized this kind of thinking, giving us the concept of limiting factors, was Justus von 
Liebig’s Organic Chemistry in its Applications to Agriculture and Physiology in 1840. In the 
decades that followed, biogeographers and climatologists investigated larger scale factors of the 
same general kind, some arguing for deterministic influences on evolution that seemed to imply 
a Lamarckian kind of process. In the twentieth century ecologists identified further possibly 
relevant factors; in a relatively little known paper, for example, George Evelyn Hutchinson 
argued that local deficiencies of trace but necessary nutrients might have a dampening effect on 
organismal success. [16] More recently students of biodiversity have used advanced monitoring 
techniques to expose variations in ambient yet potentially important evolutionary causal 
factors—for example, the relations between high diversity and high-energy environments. [17] 
Presence-and-absence thinking of this kind is something of a dead end, however, because at 
most it identifies correlations between particular factors and organisms. While it is clear that 
ecological conditions represent various combinations of lack or surplus of resources and 
organisms must be adapted accordingly to persist, the evolutionary question is more how such 
relations change in an organized, synergistic fashion. In 1984 I made the following observations: 
It is apparent that any resource that is vital to all forms of life but is only available part of the time and/or in 
some places will dictate certain spatial strategies of existence on the part of living things. Specifically, they 
will need to apportion a significant part of their total energy budget to the development and operation of 
means of being “in the right place at the right time” to obtain and conserve the resource. This directed 
behavior, whether active or passive, will lead to the development of non-random movements through time 
and space (for sedentary organisms the patterns will devolve as spatially-varying rates of successes and 
failures of individuals over time). I interpret this deviation from random movement in time and space to 
represent a direct mapping of the stress upon the system. The greater the stress (i.e., the more discontinuous 
the rate and spatial patterns of provision of the vital resource), the more non-random the movement we 
should expect. 
Such non-random patterns of direct interaction between the biotic sector and the abiotic sector will of 
necessity extend to the pattern of interaction among organisms. An obvious example is the well-known fact 
that in times of drought, carnivores often hunt near the waterholes their prey frequent. [18] 
The basic idea here, which I have also discussed elsewhere [19], is that the more the need to be 
in “particular places at particular times,” the more the organism’s energy—and genetic—budget 
must be tied up in supporting specialized adaptive responses. Conversely, less stressful 
environments will be less demanding in this respect, allowing selective drift, and the evolution of 
generalist species.  Models identifying the nature and measure of this kind of stress can be 
imagined; from these geographical clines of same can be envisioned which should affect the rate 
and directionality of both in-dispersal and removal of forms (per related rules of assembly). In 
my doctoral dissertation support was found for one such model, involving the soil moisture 
cycle.  More recently I performed a follow-up analysis: if in fact the species that inhabit low-
stress areas are more genetically diverse (at least in the sense of their promoting further 
phylogenesis), then they should exhibit a higher incidence of subspeciation throughout their 
range. This turned out to be markedly so. [20] It would also be interesting to investigate this 
matter in terms of the so-called “Neutral Theory of Molecular Evolution” (as developed 
especially by Motoo Kimura and Masatoshi Nei [21] ), since one can project that genetic drift 
would likely play a greater role in identifying new viable structures under a regime of low 
environmental stress of this type. Recent work by Andreas Wagner [22] might also be relevant in 
this context, as stepwise mutation to the ends of adaptation in the sense he describes might also 
be more likely in environments which are not so dominated by being “in particular places at 
particular times.” 
In sum, if it can be shown that range change in populations is nonrandom, and slowly tends 
in those (geographical) directions that permit integration into generalist-promoting ecological 
settings, then we will have an understanding of how complexification in an evolutionary sense 
works—that is, how the constraints on biological function are lifted, rather than imposed.  Such 
processes will undoubtedly be relatable to certain conditions of the environment, but it will 
probably be some spatial/temporal integration of these that will constitute the driving force, and 
not just large or small amounts of one thing or another. [23] 
3.2.2. Implicit Constraints 
Implicit Constraints. There are many exact ways that a species can go extinct, but apart from 
catastrophic events for very localized populations (as on a small island), these usually involve no 
longer being able to make use of some vital resource (including other members of the species). 
While such outcomes can often be understood after the fact as a simple inability to select 
responses to various stresses fast enough, one can imagine other, less immediate, causal 
scenarios. One involves conflicting causal inertias. For example, it is not a priori implausible 
that the demise of some higher taxa throughout history has been due to their adopting a 
physiological plan at one time that later would no longer work because of ambient environmental 
changes whose impact was of such a nature as to supersede available selection options. As a 
possible example of this, briefly consider the evolution and extinction of the dinosaurs. 
A 2002 summary of the evolution of atmospheric oxygen levels [24] suggests that after an 
early Mesozoic peak its percentage constitution of the atmosphere dropped sharply, then 
increased fairly continuously to double its original level by the end of the Mesozoic. This 
corresponds very closely to the period of time during which the dinosaurs evolved and existed, 
and one might relate the two facts as follows. Suppose that evolving endothermy under relatively 
low levels of atmospheric oxygen necessitated one of two means of balancing heat loss and 
retention: (1) small size (to promote heat loss under high temperature conditions) combined with 
external insulation (to promote heat retention at low temperatures), or (2) large size (to promote 
heat retention) combined with internal or negligible insulation (to promote heat loss). Let us 
further suppose that the second strategy, while workable under low ambient oxygen level 
conditions, has no guarantee of working well—or at all—under much higher level conditions. 
Dinosaurs thus eventually would have faced a problem, as it might have been impossible to 
select an adaptive response that at one time reduced their rates of oxygen processing, yet 
supported active ecological engagement. 
This theory, if true, would help explain a number of peripheral historical phenomena: for 
example, that all dinosaurs were at least relatively large (and thus all would have been affected); 
the reason for the survival of birds, mammals, and other (not endothermic) reptiles; the 
expansion of dinosaur populations to colder climates in the Cretaceous; the increasing number of 
morphological peculiarities of dinosaurs (crests, sails, etc.), which might have aided in heat 
regulation; the extinction of whole families and orders (suggesting causes based more in 
physiological commonalities than in single ecological stresses); and an apparent tendency of 
primitive current-day representatives of ancient groups to be associated with oxygen-poor 
environments. 
For a second possible instance of an “implicit constraints” kind of selection regime we turn 
to wildlife’s ten-year cycles in the Northern boreal forests. In the New World the cycling 
population levels of the varying hare, Lepus canadensis, are thought to lie at the center of this 
phenomenon, as it is a primary food source for most of the creatures whose numbers also cycle. 
Many years of study have established critical elements of the demography of the cycling 
populations, but no clear model of underlying causes. In this instance, the key to the 
phenomenon may lie in what early literature [25] referred to as the “shock disease” that seems to 
be linked to cycling hare populations, an affliction characterized by skin lesions, internal organ 
degeneration and aberrant behavior—symptoms also connected to photosensitivity disorders 
[26], which are more common at such latitudes.  Suppose that during the height(s) of the Ice 
Age, the hare population was pushed southward, and while there experienced selection pressures 
resulting in a loss both of its white color and resistance to ingested photosensitive pigments. 
With their return northward, selection for white color again became imperative, but this 
conflicted with a renewed need to be protected from photosensitive pigments (dark pelage helps 
protect organisms from this problem). It has been suggested [27] that two different morphs 
within the snowshoe hare population are battling it out for supremacy.  Since photosensitivity 
also affects reproduction in lagomorphs and other animals [28], perhaps at the low point in the 
cycle the one factor is favored, but as population levels rise this selection conflicts with its socio-
demographic dynamics. 
Both of these examples are based on supposition at the moment, but these are the kinds of 
lagged effects that cannot be ruled out as natural selection responds to a succession of immediate 
circumstances, without anticipating ultimate implications of the larger-scale system’s path. [29] 
3.2.3. Explicit Constraints 
Lastly, we come to the potentially most interesting kind of constraint that could be operating 
on the “removal of the unfit”: a priori structural limitations. 
Although it is apparent that most mutations are deleterious and result in individuals that are 
either aborted after conception or cannot compete and die before reproducing, the full controls 
affecting these eventualities are undoubtedly far from fully known. The DNA molecule is a 
highly stable one, both as an immediate organizer of biochemical activity and as an evolutionary 
structure, but we have no way of knowing at present whether its evolution is due solely to a 
stochastically arrived-at random walk over time, or further influences of a prior structural type.  
Beyond this, the same can be said for the environment outside the organism. 
In 1986 I advanced a model [30], derived in part from the thoughts of the philosopher 
Benedict de Spinoza, that involved a curious idea: that all natural systems might be underlain by 
a single, common, form of structural organization related to the way they subsystemize 
internally. In the years that followed a particular version of this theory emerged; this is amenable 
both to simulation and empirical application. A number of simulations and pilot studies 
followed, all of which continue to support the potential viability of the approach. Further details 
are not important at the moment, but the notion that there could be a priori constraints on the 
nature of diversification is an interesting one to contemplate.  
In such a world, not only would many structures not have come into being (as a matter of 
chance or stochastic ineventuality), but their existence, as a functioning element of physical 
space, would be impossible a priori. This is not to say that an infinite number of forms and 
eventualities would not still be possible, just that a “larger” infinite number would not be. 
Otherwise put, a “final cause” would be introduced into play that would absolutely restrict 
natural expression of form and structure to a subset of what might otherwise be viewed as 
possibly resulting from a simple (or constrained at the time) “random walk”-like process. 
Natural selection—the removal of the unfit—would operate locally in exactly the way 
Wallace imagined, keeping populations “up to snuff.” But its results would become more and 
more a function of organization taking place at a more remote level as global biogeochemical 
cycles came into equilibrium with the “final cause” and established local spatial/temporal 
conditions of turnover of all fundamental resources. Thus, the opportunities for “being in the 
right place at the right time” would tend to become more subtle, more stable, and less confining: 
actually, in one sense less diverse, if one considered the matter in terms of extremes of condition 
only. 
Meanwhile, the DNA molecule itself would be affected in interesting ways. As its own 
system having to conform to the basic structural limitations implied by the final cause (of 
internal pattern of subsystemization), most significant changes away from its already-existing 
form would not be possible, thus thwarting either the initial stages of reproduction (including 
fertilization itself), or later ones. Some such processes arguably would represent a selection 
process that was not natural selection as we (or for that matter Wallace) would recognize it, as it 
would remove individuals from existence before they could environmentally (or even 
developmentally) engage.  Yet it could also be argued that natural selection was being influenced 
by this process, because the individuals produced under this constraint would no longer represent 
a “random” sample of the totality of imaginably emergent structures, but one from which a 
nonrandom sample of forms had been removed a priori. 
The particular General Systems Theory model I have introduced in this regard may or may 
not prove to mirror reality, but even if it does not, a conceptually more apt approach might yet 
retain some of its properties. The notion of the possible existence of a priori constraints on 
structural complexity in a physical, dimensional, world, is a fascinating one, and one not 
necessarily so hard to demonstrate as one might initially imagine. 
Whatever the fate of the individual theoretical scenarios briefly described above, the more 
general point with regard to natural selection still stands.  This is, as Wallace understood many 
years ago and others have since, that the actual causal basis of a model of change that relies on 
tautological ideas is likely to remain obscure.  To examine the root factors for a process as 
complex as evolution, we need to identify potential causalities in a way that does not confuse 
causes with results. 
4. CONCLUSION 
I am not alone in thinking that some fresh approaches are in order. Peter Bowler has recently 
expressed some reservations about the “Darwin industry,” stating: “modern Darwinians may 
actually benefit from diverting some of their energy to uncovering and making more visible the 
work of those evolutionists who looked for other ways of trying to explain the development of 
life on Earth.”[31] In another recent column, historian and sociologist Stephen Shapin aptly 
writes: 
‘Adaptationists’ take it as securely established that organic change proceeds through the natural selection of 
individual traits, each of which improves the organism’s reproductive chances, that each trait’s 
evolutionary end-point represents an optimum, and that no other process is needed for an evolutionary 
lineage to move along through time. But adaptationism has distinguished critics within biology 
departments—Richard Lewontin, Niles Eldredge and the late Stephen Jay Gould among them—and they 
have argued that there is a difference between asserting adaptation as a possible means of getting smoothly 
from evolutionary point A to point B and establishing that this is in fact how organic change has occurred. 
Maybe there are developmental constraints on how traits change, and change with respect to other traits; 
maybe some traits are accidental by-products of changes in other traits; maybe evolutionary change is in 
fact discontinuous; maybe there is a dialectical causal relationship between organisms and the 
environmental niches to which they ‘adapt’; maybe processes other than adaptation are at work but we just 
don’t know much about them yet. The adaptationist camp includes Dawkins, Dennett and Pinker—some of 
the most enthusiastic Darwin Year celebrants. Adaptationists tend to give spectators a misleading picture of 
the scientific state of play, while at the same time laying claim to a founding father who in fact had 
reservations about the power and sufficiency of natural selection. There is a struggle among scientists for 
Darwin’s soul. It is understandable that modern evolutionists should configure history as best suits present 
purposes, but truth in advertising should be part of the exercise. [32] 
Chomsky [33], Deacon [34], and others, meanwhile, have expressed reservations with the 
Darwinian approach to the evolution of language.  Similar reservations may be found in works 
regarding other adaptationism-related evolutionary subjects. [35] Meanwhile, in his study of 
explanation in Darwinian evolutionary theory Bock [36] agrees with me that “Natural selection 
is better treated as either survival of the fit [i.e., not fittest], or as elimination of the unfit.” 
Despite the basically critical nature of my remarks here, I feel that a “demoted” natural 
selection—Wallace’s “elimination of the unfit”—is likely to result in a clearer understanding of 
how selection promotes an evolutionary agenda.  In particular, a greater focus on longer term, 
larger scale environmental interdependencies, should invigorate ecological and biogeographical 
studies, and give us new kinds of insight into those natural processes that have made us who and 
what we are.  
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